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行为科学和政策干预交织立异团队线下分享会——第七期

2022年10月26日安博电竞治理学院行为科学和政策干预交织立异团队第七次线下分享会顺遂举行。。。。。。本次分享会约请到应用经济学系刘烁教授和韩禄康(Lukas Hensel)博士分享研究兴趣和研究希望。。。。。。


刘烁教授

刘烁教授主要关注四个偏向的研究:行为经济学和工业组织的连系、组织经济学、机制和信息设计与博弈论、视察实验的要领和应用。。。。。。


刘烁教授着重介绍了行为工业组织理论(behavioral industrial organization)领域的研究。。。。。。这一领域的古板范式是假设厂商利润最大化和理性的消耗者可以做出最优选择。。。。。。但大宗研究批注,,消耗者远非教科书中的理性人,,现实的消耗者行为中保存种种偏误:注重力有限、时间偏好的纷歧致性、太过自信等。。。。。。因此,,行为工业组织经济学研究在思量到消耗者行为偏误的情形下,,将工业组织经济学原有的古板假设改为厂商利润最大化和消耗者的有限理性。。。。。。因此,,研究问题也转酿成厂商怎样通过合约设计和广告投放等战略“聚敛”消耗者。。。。。。同时,,研究也关注消耗者偏误对厂商来说是否一定有利,,工业规制政策能否起到理性模子所预期的作用等问题。。。。。。


刘教授首先介绍了消耗者偏好漫衍与厂商战略的研究。。。。。。该研究的念头在于,,由于产品信息的重大性,,消耗者往往很难准确地做出最优决议。。。。。。同时,,信息提供的详细方式和产品庞洪水平很洪流平上由厂商战略性决议。。。。。。当消耗者受制于有限理性时,,厂商会怎样决议???常见的工业规制手段对提高消耗者福利的效果怎样???


假设市场上有两个厂商,,该研究将消耗者偏好漫衍分为两种情形:偏好漫衍趋于中性和偏好漫衍趋于极化。。。。。。偏好中性意味着市场上摇晃未必的消耗者较多,,例如关于不喝啤酒的人来说差别啤酒之间的区别很是细微,,因此没有明确的偏好。。。。。。偏好极化意味着市场上意见强烈的消耗者较多,,例如消耗者对外出时选择家庭型旅馆照旧商务型旅馆的偏好通常较量明确。。。。。。


当消耗者偏好漫衍趋于中性时,,厂商倾向于举行具有疑惑性的营销手段,,即通过发送噪音(obfuscation)使产品信息越发重大。。。。。。这是由于在一定概率下,,原本摇晃未必的消耗者在吸收到厂商发出的噪音后越发偏好这一厂商。。。。。。制造噪音之后消耗者偏好极化的效果更显著,,从而增强厂商的定价能力,,软化市场价钱竞争。。。。。。若是漫衍趋于极化,,增添噪音可能使原来有明确偏好的消耗者变得摇晃未必,,从而降低厂商定价能力。。。。。。因此在偏好漫衍趋于极化时,,厂商应更倾向于使用具有教育性的营销手段,,以增强定价能力,,软化价钱竞争。。。。。。


这一研究的政策启示包括,,若接纳强制信息披露,,在偏好中性的情形下,,消耗者将显着获益;;;;;而在偏好极化的情形下,,接纳强制信息披露虽然镌汰了错配,,但反而会提高市场价钱。。。。。。若接纳政府指定提供基本类型产品,,偏好中性的情形下,,消耗者的福利可能受损,,而在偏好极化的情形下,,政策可能没有用果。。。。。。


刘烁教授随后介绍了定向广告与有限注重力研究。。。。。。研究念头在于,,大数据时代,,精准定向广告的泛起并没有终结垃圾信息。。。。。。该研究重点关注放松消耗者有无限注重力这一隐含假设对研究定向广告投放效果的影响。。。。。。若是消耗者的注重力是有限的,,当同时吸收到多份信息时,,消耗者往往只能注重到少部分信息,,且纷歧定会注重到最有价值的信息,,定向广告的有用性取决于广密告送的单位本钱。。。。。。当广密告送本钱较高时,,厂商与消耗者间可能泛起完全错配。。。。。。当广密告送本钱较低时,,厂商则会陷入囚徒逆境,,再次陷入无限投放,,同时导致对厂商的负向激励循环,,厂商也没有念头提供更有精度的广告。。。。。。


刘烁教授近期关注的行为科学研究包括:信息更新中的相关性忽视(correlation-neglecting)、简朴抽样决议(sampling without prior)和形象记挂(image concerns)。。。。。。


刘烁教授与其他加入教授就厂商在极化偏好下怎样软化价钱竞争、强制信息披露政策的效果和厂商广告精准投放能力等议题睁开了交流讨论。。。。。。


韩禄康博士

Dr. Hensel introduced his two arms of research agenda related to behavioral economics. One is the motives of political activists, and the other being the information and labor markets in developing countries. For political activity studies, he is particularly interested in strategic interactions, the hybrid between traditional economics and other motives in the behavioral literature, and the effect of voice on political activism.


For information and labor market research in developing countries, in addition to the traditional development story, he focuses on the impacts of incomplete information on labor market frictions, belief formation, and signal interpretation. He also studies the success of workers and workplace and hiring outcomes relating to socioemotional skills. In addition, he explores the implication of expectations on worker turnover, specifically about how expectations about job satisfaction compare to job seekers’ realized job satisfaction, to ultimately make statements about the rationality of these expectations. The unifying themes in Dr. Hensel’s research are field experiments, limited information, and belief formation.


He first talked about his research on political activists with respect to canvassing. The motivation of the research is that people’s beliefs about others’ canvassing intentions are often incorrect. Hence, this research studies the effect of providing true information on the strategic interactions between party members’ canvassing efforts. Dr Hensel’s research shows that when given information on the competing party’s increased campaigning effort, the treatment group reduces canvassing participation towards the election.They observe that the increased competition lowered party supporters’ political self-efficacy, leading to subdued participation.


Using an experiment with the sample population, they found that when given information on own party’s increased campaigning effort, the treatment group also reduces canvassing effort towards the election. They discovered huge heterogeneity among the treated, such that members with weak ties to the party are more likely to free ride on other member’s campaigning effort.


In another study, Dr. Hensel explored the different strategic interactions across movements. His research found that when treated with own party’s campaigning effort, left-wing individuals exhibit strategic complementarity, whereas right-wing individuals exhibit strategic substitutability. However, this research has yet to reach a conclusion about the underlying mechanisms of this striking difference. It could be driven by differences at the individual level, movement level, or society level.


As a result, Dr. Hensel’s next step on political movement research is to provide evidence on the motives. Open text response shows that more than 40% indicates no change in efforts, while more than 30% claims to adjust efforts according to strategic substitutability. Conditioning on strategic substitutability, a structured response shows that 80% were due to free-riding. Conditioning on strategic complementarity, the result was less uniform, with concerns such as social image, reciprocity, increasing returns, enjoyment, and other motivations. Dr. Hensel suggested that mechanism experiments might be difficult to separate the individual effects, which calls for theoretical models with heterogeneous agents and motives.


For labor market in developing countries, Dr. Hensel emphasizes the importance of information provision. Dr. Hensel outlined the research project where he and coauthors helped workers in South Africa to learn about their comparative advantage in skills. They offered assessments on six skills and provided extensive information afterwards about their performance and how to use it in job search. This experiment found that the treated group went on to seek more jobs matched with their comparative advantage in skills and had higher earnings after 3 months. The results also exhibit some heterogeneity among the sample. The result of the assessment for those already have correct information about themselves was minimal. In other words, the treatment was only effective for those with wrong prior information.


Dr. Hensel discussed with other professors regarding how to reach an overarching theory to reconcile the differences in political activism and the possibility of using priming to identify underlying mechanisms.


分享人

刘烁,,现任安博电竞应用经济学系助理教授。。。。。。刘烁教授的研究关注行为经济学理论在企业竞争、市场羁系和组织内部激励设计等问题中的应用。。。。。。他的研究可以被应用于剖析消耗者的非理性决议模式对厂商竞争战略(例如定价与广告投放)有用性的影响和企业内部绩效评估制度与治理职员社会性偏好的激励相容性等问题。。。。。。这些研究为政府怎样通过信息披露和标准制订等相对柔性的羁系手段去;;;;;び邢蘩硇韵恼叩母@⒅傅计笠底叱龅托У摹扒敉侥婢场笔骄赫确矫娴囊樘馓峁┧夹骱徒ㄒ椤。。。。。


韩禄康(Lukas Hensel),,现任安博电竞应用经济学系博士后。。。。。。韩禄康博士关注行为经济在生长、劳动和政策上的应用。。。。。。他的研究详细关注期望值对行为的影响,,好比求职者的期望值对找事情的影响、个人对人为、 事情情形、提升空间和外部时机的预期对告退率的影响,,以及选举活动出席人数预期对政治活动家参选的影响。。。。。。韩禄康博士主要用现场和新闻实验识别期望值对行为的因果影响。。。。。。他也对心理康健与贫穷的关系很有兴趣。。。。。。


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